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NOTES

ject matter of theft which the 1942 Criminal Code sought to
eliminate.
J. C. Parkerson

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - STATE CONVICTION SUBSEQUENT TO
FEDERAL ACQUITTAL FOR THE SAME ACT NOT DOUBLE
JEOPARDY OR DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

Defendant was acquitted in federal court for robbery of a
federally insured savings and loan association. Subsequently he
was convicted in a state court under a state robbery statute, the
same conduct being the basis for both prosecutions. On appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, defendant pleaded that the former
acquittal was a bar to the subsequent state prosecution, but the
court affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether there was a due process
or double jeopardy violation. On rehearing,' held, in a five to
four decision, conviction affirmed. Conviction in a state court
subsequent to an acquittal in a federal court for the same act
is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 S.Ct. 676 (U.S. 1959).
The problem of dual prosecutions has been presented to the
Supreme Court many times in cases of a federal prosecution
subsequent to a state prosecution for the same act, and the federal conviction has been upheld. The possibility that the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment might apply to such
cases was precluded by the early development of a double sovereignty theory.2 Under this theory the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the offensive conduct may be prosecuted
under both federal and state statutes without violation of double
jeopardy when both sovereignties have separate interests to protect, 3 because such punishments are not two punishments for one
1. Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1958), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court decision was affirmed by an evenly divided court.
2. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852) : "[Every citizen] may
be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for
Yet it cannot be truly averred that the
an infraction of the laws of either ....
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He
could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other."
3. If there is an absence of separate interests, the problem would probably fall
in the area of preemption. See note 5 infra.
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crime, but punishment for two crimes arising out of the same
4
act.
In the case of a state prosecution subsequent to a federal
prosecution the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment

is not involved because it does not apply to the states.5 Aside
from the possibility that a state conviction may sometimes be
void where the subject matter has been preempted by the federal government, 6 the only other basis for invalidation is the
situation where the second prosecution is deemed "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind ' 7 to such a degree as to be violative
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While
there have been no prior Supreme Court decisions squarely in
point, the state courts have repeatedly upheld subsequent state
trials on the dual sovereignty theory," despite state constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy.9
In facing the problem of a state conviction following a federal
acquittal in the instant case the Supreme Court could have drawn
a logical analogy from its decisions upholding a federal conviction after a state trial by employing the dual sovereignty theory.
In these cases the court made broad, definite statements that
a person "could not plead the punishment by one [sovereignty]
4. See note 2 8upra. See also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922),
which has become the leading case stating the dual sovereignty theory. It was
followed in Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); Westfall v. United
States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
5. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 418 (1847). Nor do the first eight amendments apply per se to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6. This is outside the scope of this Note. If there are not separate interests
involved, and there is both federal and state legislation in the field, the state courts
may be preempted by the federal exercise of power. See Notes, 19 LoUIsIANA LAW
REVIEW 864, 868 (1959).
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). It may be seen, by looking
at the judicial definitions of substantive due process violations that an overwhelming revulsion to the action is necessary, not mere distaste. Thus, it is expressed as action which "shocks the conscience" in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1956). In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416 (1945), substantive
due process was defined as a deprivation which offends "those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even
toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." For a discussion of substantive due process, see Note, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 726 (1958).
8. Heier v. State, 191 Ind. 410 (1921). State conviction for transportation of
alcoholic beverages following federal conviction for possession of the liquor so
transported held to be valid. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1231 (1922), 22 A.L.R. 1551
(1923), for discussion of additional state decisions in this area.
9. In 1935 in the introductory note of the Official Draft of Administration of
Criminal Law, covering double jeopardy, the American Law Institute stated that
thirty-five states have double jeopardy prohibitions worded identically to the Fifth
Amendment proscription of double jeopardy. Eight other states had some type
prohibition of second trials.
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in bar to a conviction by the other,"' 10 with no mention of the
sovereignty in which the first prosecution must occur. It may
be noted that in these cases, after the double jeopardy problem
was surmounted by the dual sovereignty theory, there was no
mention of possible violations of due process. 1 In the instant
case the Supreme Court did not base its decision on these
analogous prior decisions, but reasoned from the more specific
principle that the numerous decisions allowing double prosecutions for the same act by different sovereignties showed that
such dual prosecutions were not so "repugnant to the conscience
of mankind' 2 as to constitute violations of due process. For example, the court relied on numerous state decisions holding subsequent convictions by state courts valid by applying the dual
sovereignty theory as being indicative of an absence of sufficient
repugnancy to constitute a due process violation.' 8
The surprisingly vigorous three-judge dissent 14 attacked the
majority opinion's view that the numerous state and Supreme
Court decisions are indicative of an absence of abhorrence of
two prosecutions for the same act, and even denounced the dual
sovereignty theory. They would have reversed the Supreme
Court's prior decisions,' 5 and in a dissenting opinion by the same
Justices in a case decided this term of court, would have held
that a federal conviction subsequent to a state conviction is unconstitutional.' 6 Concluding that the cases which were held by
the majority to be indicative of an acceptance of dual prosecutions are based on an invalid fiction, Mr. Justice Black declared:
"Looked at from the standpoint of the person who is being
prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp. If double
punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two 'Sovereigns' to inflict it than for one.' 7 The dissent appears to have
10. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852).
11. It must be remembered that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the federal courts hearing these subsequent prosecutions just as
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the state court
involved in the hearing of the instant case.
12. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
13. See note 11 supra.
14. The dissent referred to here is Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
which Mr. Justice Douglas and the Chief Justice joined, concurring. Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion is referred to separately when discussed infra.
15. Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 S. Ct. 676, 695 (U.S. 1959), dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Black: "I would hold that a federal trial following either state
acquittal or conviction is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."
16. Abbate & Falcone v. United States, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959), dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Black.
17. Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 S. Ct. 676 (U.S. 1959), dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Black.
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been based on a fundamental belief that such dual prosecutions
are violative of the spirit and purpose of the Fifth Amendment
and are examples of abuse of the separateness of the states and
the federal government. Referring to early Greek and Roman
concepts as well as early Christian writings, 18 the dissent concluded that dual prosecutions have always been considered grossly unjust and still "shock the conscience"' 19 of moral societies.
Mr. Justice Brennan's separate dissenting opinion was based
upon a different conclusion. It was his opinion from the facts
that the state prosecution was brought about by the federal
prosecutors and made only upon their insistence, and that therefore the second prosecution was actually a double jeopardy violation disguised by the use of the state courts.
The decision in the istant case is supported by a well-settled
line of jurisprudence which recognizes the separate sovereignities of the state and federal governments. The majority opinion
also expressed some fear, that, as a practical consideration, a
contrary decision might result in a breakdown of law enforcement on the state level if the states' rights to prosecute for basic
criminal offenses were interfered with. On this point the majority opinion seems weak. It cannot be assumed, as pointed out
by the three-judge dissent, that the federal government and the
states are each attempting to undermine the other's system of
law enforcement; and there is little possibility that a rule,
making a former prosecution by either a bar to subsequent prosecution by the other, would result in a serious impediment to
maintaining order. This dissent bears careful scrutiny for it
may well reveal a trend toward prohibitions against dual prosecutions altogether.

20

Lamar E. Ozley, Jr.
18. Ibid.
19. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
20. It is interesting to note that the position taken by the American Law
Institute Model Penal Code is somewhat similar to that taken by the dissenting
opinion. Section 1.11 of the Model Penal Code provides: "When conduct constitutes an 6ffense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of the
United States or another state, a prosecution in any such jurisdiction is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this state under the following circumstances:
"(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined
in Section 1.09 and the subsequent prosecution is based on:
"(a) the same conduct; or
"(b) the same series of acts or omissions, unless the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other or the

